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This paper seeks to examine and analyze the tension between formal 
institutions and informal institutions assessing explanatory factors regarding 
successful access to housing by the urban poor in Zimbabwe. The paper provides 
an anecdotal assessment on issues of the state opening up space for non-state 
actors, and, how these housing cooperatives have strived to formalize their 
operations while others have used party politics for development and ‘survival’. A 
literature review and case study of selected women housing cooperatives in Harare 
(Tashinga and Joshua Nkomo), was guided by the following research question: Is 
the success of the housing co-operatives mostly a function of patronage or that of a 
formalized structure that allows for transparency and accountability?  
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Introduction 
This paper draws its argument from both literature review and case 
studies of two selected women housing cooperatives in Harare – Tashinga 
and Joshua Nkomo Heights. The paper is essentially a study on the 
politicization of housing access and the quality of services stemming from 
the shift in regime types and the creation of space for non-state actors to 
enter the fold of housing provision. It advances the argument that non-state 
actors in housing provision are not at all politically neutral; most of the 
times, they ride on politics to have their agenda fulfilled. A primary 
question that this study seeks to answer is: Do housing cooperatives, as 
formalized structures facilitate greater access, especially for the 
economically disadvantaged like the majority of urban women? How 
political neutral are the cooperatives as non-state actors? To try and answer 
these questions, first the paper engages literature, gets into an overview 
about Zimbabwe and then Harare and then details of the two cooperatives 
mentioned. After this, comes a discussion of the issues and finally 
conclusion 
Overall, the Zimbabwean housing delivery in recent times has been a 
cacophony of experiences with the government, local authorities, and 
private land developers and housing cooperatives trying to address the 
divergent interests of different urban citizens (Mashoko, 2012). There has 
been a realization that the state cannot go it alone hence the need to open up 
space for more actors, especially self-help initiatives. The matter has also 
been tackled in several major government policy initiatives, for example the 
Draft National Housing Policy of 1999 which ultimately became the new 
National Housing Policy launched beginning of 2013. A number of housing 
cooperatives by the urban poor who cannot afford houses through normal 
and formal channels have emerged.  
Housing cooperatives are filling the void that has resulted from the 
failure of the state to satisfy the housing needs of the urban population 
(Mashoko, 2012. This has offered greater access to shelter and services by 
the poor and women in particular. However, housing cooperatives has been 
used by ZANU PF as a tool for championing so-called ‘development-from-
below’. The national backlog has ballooned to over a million housing units 
of with Harare, the capital city, having the greatest need. In 2003 National 
Housing Program was launched in response to the then national backlog of 
housing units of 162,000 which was tittering behind an annual production 
rate of 15,000 and 20,000. Some housing cooperatives have emerged by 
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patronage. They have usually produced poor quality housing which, in the 
long-term, may be detrimental in terms of meeting basic urban standards 
like provision of water and sewer before erection of buildings. In recent 
times, substandard housing in Harare, as in most cities of the developing 
world, has been produced in the pretext of incremental housing which in 
most cases lacks in basic sanitation and water provision posing a public 
health threat to the inhabitants (Share, 2012).  
A Critical Review on Formal Versus Informal Structures in 
Access to Housing  
The provision of housing often needs state support in order to protect 
the less-privileged members of society including women, the disabled and 
children. However, legal requirements in place, costs and lack of 
transparency often make formal housing too expensive for the 
aforementioned groups (Chirisa & Munzwa, 2008). Technical experts 
involved in designing and implementing policies are often devoid of 
understanding of either the economic situations or perceptions and 
assumptions of marginalized and less-privileged groups, often resulting in 
delays and absence of services to these groups. The success of informal 
systems is perceived to depend of the poor’s compliance with existing 
standards. Without compliance self-help housing schemes tend to be time-
consuming, marginal and exploitative (De Wit & Berner, 2009), at the same 
times grossly hampered by inadequate access to secure land (Hossain & 
Moore, 2002). Gentrification has often been cited as having an exclusionary 
effect on the urban poor. In the urban gentrification literature (for example, 
Brueckner & Selod, 2008), the poor are always at the mercy of government 
or the wealth that can ‘forcibly push’ or ‘buy them out’, respectively. When 
forced out of the place of their choice for habitat, the poor either find 
themselves in the inner city, squalid and unhealthy or the peri-urban – 
poorly serviced and unhealthy too. The peri-urban is the place outside the 
official city boundary and has semi-rural traits. Peri-urban settling implies 
urban sprawl of which urban expansion generally means that rural land is 
being ‘eaten up’ to give way for the city. Sometimes this means loss of 
revenue and other resources to the rural local authority hence the rural 
reluctantly ‘transfers’ its land to the city.  Politicians often hijack the 
process for political gain and use this to present a case where they appear to 
be helping the poor.  In that way, patronage and clientilism creep in. 
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There is recognition that housing provision in urban areas particularly 
in developing countries  remains a challenge. Rapid urbanization in most of 
these countries (due to rural to urban migration and natural increase) is the 
principal explanation to this. Most governments have failed to clear housing 
backlogs hence the opening to public-private partnerships and community-
based organization too. This liberalization of space stemming largely from 
inability to address the question of poverty is one reason why informal 
settlements have sprouted in most of these cities (Cross, 2006). Africa’s 
urban landscape, like its Asian and Latin American counterparts, has 
become highly informalized of which Cross (2006) has defined this 
informalization as a process by which the poor evades laid down formal 
rules to produce their desired outcomes. Informal land delivery systems 
imply that the poor are seeking social legitimacy (Cross, 2006) by 
harnessing on social capital of the people they know are connected to the 
formal systems. Normally these people are the elites and politicians leading 
or seeking to lead them. Formal institutions tend to have high legal 
requirements as a matter of protocol but in most cases lack in coordination 
and transparency, tending to be slow and bureaucratic in delivery (Wilt & 
Berner, 2009).  As argued by Cross (2006) and De Wit and Berner (2009), 
informal institutions are prone to abuse by elites and  politicians who in turn 
also want to gain political mileage by pretending to represent the less-
privileged of society.  
Usually, within informal institutions there is embedded political 
patronage. Thus, the urban poor can be hamstrung to the diktats of the few 
elites who have partial access to formal institutions and thrive by clientelism 
or vote buying (Desai, 2008). The usually outcome of this kind of political 
participation is poor service delivery. Politicians in Africa normally try to 
entrench or forge patron-client relationships with the urban poor populations 
being loyalists to their diktats.  Although, formal institutions tend to 
guarantee greater security in terms of tenure and protection from evictions 
or demolitions, their potency lies in their ability to maintain principles of 
good governance - transparency, coordination and the responsiveness to the 
needs of the urban populations. Tshikoshi (2009) has 
questionedunresponsive, unaccountable and corrupt governance institutions 
are recipe for failure of plans and programs usually meant for make better 
the lives of the poor. While the private sector can provide infrastructure 
services, the poor usually fail to capture this benefit given their inability to 
afford. Both the formal and informal institutions can play an important role 
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in the provision of urban infrastructure and services as long as their 
complementary roles are realized.  
The Politics and Governance of Cooperative Housing in 
Zimbabwe 
In 1980, a government headed by black Zimbabweans largely adopting 
a socialist approach to governance (Paradza, 2010). In this approach, the 
state was the major provider of public basic services, housing included. 
Such a terrain meant little involvement of the non-state actors (voluntary, 
community and private sector actors) in addressing the human needs. 
However, in no time rapid urbanization induced resource constraints a 
development which saw construction houses for urban areas becoming a 
mammoth task for the state on its own. Nevertheless, in the early years of 
independence, efforts by non-state actors were not usually well received by 
the state. In 1991, a number of homeless families were evicted from Mbare 
and other strategic places of Harare to Porta Farm because Her Highness, 
the Queen of England and Wales, Elizabeth II was coming to official open 
the 1991 Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) in the 
city. Their eviction was with speed and done in the spirit of ‘gentrifying’ the 
urban space. Again, in 1995, the veteran nationalist leader and leader of 
ZANU Ndonga, Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole settled some homeless urban 
dwellers of Harare on his Churu Farm2 and allowed them to build structures 
and stay. The ZANU PF government ‘rubbished’ this move as a ploy by 
Sithole to get votes by clientilism. It deployed the army and police to fight 
such ‘a coup plot’. It must be noted that in all these cases, it was women and 
children hit the hardest as they had to brace with the hassle of carrying 
goods and being shifted up and about. 
In 2000, Zimbabwe embarked on a fast-track land reform program 
(FTLRP). The same program provided an opportunity for land re-
organization and redistribution, mainly in the rural areas. Yet, spatial 
changes also did occur to most urban areas in which it became possible for 
the homeless to claim land for housing construction, which formal channels 
of land banking and incorporation had failed to deliver (Moyo, 2000; 2011). 
Households that had been struggling to have housing land took opportunity 
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 The farm was some few kilometers away from the city. 
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to capitalize on the land seizure process and quite a number managed to 
acquire peri-urban plots some being spearheaded by emerging housing 
cooperatives (Murowe & Chirisa, 2006). This might point to a convergence 
of somewhat two diametrically opposite agendas – rural demand for land for 
farming and urban demand for land for housing (Marongwe, 2003). A group 
of elites (politicians) spearheaded the formation of housing cooperatives that 
became the hope of the homeless to get housing (Marongwe, 2003; Toriro, 
2006; 2007). 
The Institutional Set-up for Housing Delivery 
Current problems besetting housing delivery in Zimbabwe include 
especially finance, infrastructure provision and land. In recent times, the 
country is on record having very expensive mortgages against a background 
of the majority of the urban citizens failing to fit in the bracket of those who 
can afford.  The institutional set-up is highly bureaucratic and inhibitive to 
progressive housing development. Overall, non-state actors in the housing 
sector include private, for-profit companies, as well as voluntary 
associations that are focused on shelter provision.  
The Co-operative Societies Act Chapter 24:05, the by-laws and the Co-
operative Development Policy of 2005 are the legal instruments used by co-
operatives in administering their affairs.3 At the same time, the proposed 
Land Developers Bill seeks to protect the interests of co-operative members.  
When adopted, it will help in providing guidelines on how to develop the 
land. The other instrument is the Labor Relations Act (1985) which is 
helpful in the regulation of the secretariat’s conduct. 
The Zimbabwe National Association of Housing Co-operatives 
(ZINAHCO), the apex body for housing co-operatives in Zimbabwe.4  
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 Cooperatives in Zimbabwe are self-administered institutions; legal and autonomous 
entities with powers to select their own administrative bodies, for example, composition of 
the management and supervisory committees. 
4
 ZINAHCO represents over 150 co-operatives with over 7,200 members throughout the 
country. The organization was formed in 1993 and registered on 2001 under the 
Cooperative Societies Act Chapter 24:05. Governed by a Board Committee, its programs 
are implemented by the secretariat with specialized skills in town planning, land surveying, 
civil engineering, to name these few. It helps with the training for income-generating 
projects and loan management and construction  hence developing ther capacity and 
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Characterizing Housing Cooperative Operations and Institutions in 
Zimbabwe 
The average size of a co-operative is around 50 members. However the 
membership ranges from 10 members to 400 members. Housing 
development is typically incrementally. In most cases, a co-operative 
purchases land and building materials then constructs the houses for its 
members. Different modes apply in the construction of the houses, usually 
with some combination of self-help and small builders, and in some cases, 
larger builders taking on some or the entire project. Co-operatives can 
access land that is already serviced and with title deeds from the local 
authorities.5 Nevertheless, they can do the servicing and the house 
development at the same time in those instances when they get un-serviced 
stands.  
Housing Cooperatives and the Politics of Survival by ZANU PF 
Cooperatives in Zimbabwe in have faced serious politicization. The 
government has sought, among other things, to enhance housing 
cooperatives. For instance, The Daily News of 29 November 2012, through 
its reporter, Kachembere (2012:1) observes how the government, through a 
revised national housing policy was seeking, among other things “… to 
promote housing cooperatives, improve networking and stakeholder co-
ordination and as well as create a database in the housing delivery 
program”. This follows years of economic doldrums and dysfunctionality in 
many state institutions. ZANU PF has pushed the cooperative agenda 
immensely. Seeing this gap, communities have coaxed the party to act in 
their plea for land to build by suggesting that they will vote it to power. 
During run-up to elections, the state always embrace cooperatives/informal 
settlements, but then reject them in others instances especially if the votes 
turn out to be out favor with the party, especially ZANU PF. This variation 
in state responses puts both the voters and the state in limbo. They always 
find they are in need of each other albeit informally and in cheating of each 
                                                                                                                            
ensuring the sustainability of programs of the cooperatives. Moreover, it provides loans to 
member housing co-operatives to build core houses gradually for each of their members.  
5
 Servicing the land involves engineering designs, roads and water systems hence the 
housing cooperatives must allocate financial resources that could otherwise be used to build 
more houses.  
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other. This is really interesting in terms of the central state, local 
government and cooperative roles at various points in the housing process. 
For example in the period running up to the July 31, 2013 Harmonized 
Elections, ZANU PF organized urban residents around cooperatives, a 
development which is credited to its ability to secure urban seats after more 
than a decade of failure to do so hence losing to its rival, the MDC.  
The Case of Harare 
Harare has, for example, 2,050 registered co-operatives housing 
cooperatives in the city vary immensely in terms of their origins and history, 
the internal dynamics of cooperation (including gender and employment 
status of the members) and interaction with outside players (including 
politicians and potential funders). These factors may explain the differential 
success rates these cooperatives have. Recently it has been noted of how 
“…large open spaces where urban farming used to thrive in Tafara, 
Mabvuku, Mufakose, Epworth and Hatcliffe, have been taken up by housing 
cooperatives and informal sector businesses” (Matonho, 2012:4). This is 
part of the urban footprint debate of which urban land generally is a highly 
contested factor.  
As of 2012, most stands6 in Harare’s high-density areas “… cost an 
average of US50 cents per square meter” (Share, 2012). The majority of the 
home seekers are civil servants are civil servants earning US$300 a month 
hence do not qualify for mortgage bonds. Mortgage loans at most financial 
lending institutions attract a 15 percent interest repaid over 10 years.  One 
such financial institution is the First Banking Corporation (FBC), which has 
housing units in such places of Harare as Glaudina, Waterfalls, Helensvale 
and Philadelphia. A good number of houses in these places require a deposit 
of US$17 000 and a US$900 monthly payment for the agreed years. Failure 
to service the mortgage payments results in the “…bank repossessing the 
house or stand. The stand or house would be resold for the bank to recoup 
its money” (Share, 2012). The majority high and middle-income earners can 
                                                 
6A stand is a lot or plot, usually created through layout planning and subdivision (or 
consolidation) of land. On this lot, a housing structure is built. There are three basic types 
of stands in Zimbabwe – high-density stand (averaging 250 square meters), medium-
density (averaging 450 square meters) and low-density stand (usually between 800 and 
2000 square meters).  
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afford houses and residential stands through loans from banks and lending 
institutions at an arranged interest rate which can be up to 25 years. In 
keeping with the non-access to housing finance is the issue of the housing 
backlog. Harare has more than 40 000 residents on its housing waiting list 
(though they could be more who have not registered). Delays in securing a 
stand have resulted in some losing faith and pulling out of the register. In 
recent times, loans for housing in Harare, have been pegged housing in 
medium and low-density between US$5 000 and US$90 000 a price range 
making it impossible for the ordinary person to own a stand or a house. This 
private sector strategy is available only to the wealthier class or formal 
sector employees. Since the majority of low-income earners cannot afford 
this. The development justifies the rise of housing cooperatives as a self-
help housing strategy in the city. During the period between 1999 and 2008, 
housing cooperatives managed to build 2,351 houses. More than 40 000 
cooperative members were resident on more than 11,479 stands in Harare as 
at 2012. Consequently, many have turned to housing cooperatives, which 
have become a national urban phenomenon. 
Many cooperatives have emerged in the peri-urban zone of Harare in 
rural districts that borders the city - Goromonzi, Mazowe, Zvimba and Seke. 
The City of Harare has demanded that certain ‘urban standards’ be first 
achieved before it can take responsibility of the peri-urban settlements 
(Toriro, 2007). Failure to achieve that has seen the incorporation of peri-
urban settlement largely by cooperatives into the city. Housing cooperatives 
sell plots at intrinsic value. This has seen a ‘stands’ rush’ with numerous 
people joining housing cooperatives (Share, 2012). The City of Harare has 
demanded that certain ‘urban standards’ be first achieved before it can take 
responsibility of the peri-urban settlements. Their incorporation into urban 
Harare remains undone. This idea is on seeking to cut costs such as rent on 
those building.  With respect to Hatcliffe, the peri-urban settlers who were 
uprooted from Porta Farm, Churu farm as well as Dzivarasekwa benefited 
from the housing savings’ schemes.  In Hatcliffe, CBOs have embraced all 
sorts of innovations including alternative technology for conventional water 
and sewer systems like sky loos. However, those sections of the community 
that have managed to install the conventional water and sewer pipes, they 
remain dry and boreholes and conventional sewer pipes have been proposed. 
The then Ministry of National Housing and Social Amenities accepted 
CBOs in the provision of low-income houses through an incremental 
approach with some CBOs lobbying for in situ building.  
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A Comparison of Two Housing Cooperatives in Harare 
Generally, co-operative based housing projects in Harare are 
spontaneous and most of them revolutionary. From a spatial planning point 
of view, the execution of housing development is ad hoc with no or 
minimum co-ordination. Housing development by cooperatives can take 
more than 20 years for members access their ‘house’. In the forthcoming 
paragraphs, the main outcomes in different cooperatives are assessed by 
way of comparison of two cooperatives in the city. The analysis seeks to 
measure the level of success. In each cooperative examining the number of 
houses constructed, level of access by the poor especially participation by 
women. The different influencing factors are highlighted.  
Tashinga Housing Cooperative has managed to pay for the construction 
of the sewer, road reticulation and storm water drain projects from the 
savings. Joshua Nkomo cooperative have failed to do so. On the other hand 
Joshua Nkomo cooperative have managed to build core house to its 
members but looking closely one can note that the houses are not even 
enough to cater for every member of the cooperatives. Moreover, the same 
housing cooperatives have pounced on this opportunity to milk the 
desperate urban poor. New members as will be noted in the case of Joshua 
Nkomo have taken over the cooperatives and reportedly old members are 
complaining that they are not ‘patriotic’ are not following the core values of 
the cooperatives thereby increased rate of corruption. It has of become a 
cash cow for cooperatives leaders at the expense of development. Also as 
evident from both cooperatives, members are mandated to pay monthly 
subscriptions in the hope that the money will be channeled towards 
servicing and building of houses. However, corruptive tendencies seem to 
be stalling progress of these cooperatives.  
Tashinga Housing Cooperative 
Tashinga Housing Cooperative is a community-based cooperative in 
Dzivarasekwa that was formed formed by domestic workers employed in 
Malbereign low-density suburb in 1988. At its formation, it had 224 
members of which 162 (72%) were women. A study by Chirisa and 
Munzwa in 2008 revealed how, (at the time of that study), most of the 
members were involved in informal activities (selling fruits, vegetables and 
clothes). Reasons for doing this they explained, as the derisory wages they 
were receiving from their employers.  The founder of the cooperative, Miss 
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Eneasia Kuchidzemhanduha been its chairperson to date. The management 
committee of the committee (at the time of the 2008 study) comprised only 
three women out of the nine that as elected representatives.   
Since 1988, the chairperson’s salary was Z$300 per month and was 
insufficient to acquire housing. Given this situation, she decided to mobilize 
people in a similar situation with the view to form a cooperative and pool 
resources. They approached the local authority to provide them with land. 
Members agreed to set a ceiling on the number of people who could become 
members as a strategy to manage the processes of building houses and 
allocating the core houses finished. Members legible as co-operators had to 
be residents from Malbereign and homeless. The joining fee was Z$2 and 
the monthly subscription was Z$125 payable by all members. Tashinga 
acquired land at a cost of Z$1,720,000 on which 224 stands of 300 square 
meters each were allocated to each member. This amount was raised entirely 
from the cooperative’s savings (Munzwa, 1999). The cooperative was 
guided by its set of byelaws including regular attendance by members to 
general meetings (held at the beginning of every month), fining those who 
did not attend and forfeiture of membership if members missed three 
consecutive meetings without cause. Besides doing its own internal 
arrangements for survival and taking establishing its foothold in housing 
provision, Tashinga also relied on the then may. Kuchidzemhandu has 
explained,  
“For us to make it, it was not easy. There were fights we 
had to make especially regarding land access thanks to the 
then Mayor Chikwavaire. He had an ear to listen to our 
story and to work with us. He was our guarantor of what 
we did later after we got land from the city council. We 
went to him for support and advice often.” (Chirisa and 
Munzwa 2008:24).   
In addition, Tashinga appointed Housing People of Zimbabwe (HPZ) 
as its project manager. It made significant strides in the acquisition and 
developing its land. HPZ signed the service agreement because the 
cooperative, through its management committee was empowered to do so. 
Further, HPZ assisted in getting engineers to produce the engineering 
drawings and bills of quantity for the major services needed (including 
sewerage and water sanitation, roads and storm drains). The level of 
organization was high at every stage of payment made to the contractor. 
Tashinga managed to pay for the construction of the sewer, road reticulation 
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and storm water drain projects from the savings it made within a six-year 
period. HPZ drew the cooperative plans for a fee. In 1995, the total costs 
payable by the cooperative including sewer installation costs, at the 
obtaining rate of inflation of 30%, totaled Z$34 840. The total amount of the 
project was going to total Z$46 0003 200, with funds availed in the first 
year (Munzwa, 1999). An application made to CABS for a loan, was 
successful through the help of HPZ. Upon receiving the offer letter, the 
cooperative decided to retreat and go the savings route. By 1997, Tashinga 
had built 35 core houses at the cost of Z$3,000,000. The finished houses 
were let to the members at a cost of Z$340 per month per unit. By the end of 
1997 the cooperative was collecting Z$57,820 per month from monthly 
contributions of Z$205 per member per month plus Z$340 per month per 
unit from the 35 core houses. The house construction stage was not going to 
be as smooth as the other stages as the savings had run out. The survey by 
Chirisa and Munzwa (2008) further revealed that 180 of the 224 houses had 
been constructed, albeit, at different stages - 30%of the houses were 
complete, 20% had 4-6 rooms completed, 30% of the completed houses had 
been taken over by members who built through loans or savings from 
children helping parents as they were now employed. Title deeds could only 
be given to owners after all the houses were completed. Five percent (5%) 
of the original members had pulled out. The majority of the finished houses 
belonged to the late comers who had taken over from the members who had 
withdrawn. Some old members complained that these new members did not 
have the interests of the cooperative at heart. This case shows the short-
changing on progress that resulted due to the management of the 
cooperatives refusing assistance by ‘external organizations’ albeit to the 
detriment of the development strides. In addition, the internal dynamics of 
the cooperative indicates the politics and strife that exist where members are 
new and ‘stigmatized’ as out of touch with the allegiance to the cooperative 
philosophy.  
Joshua Nkomo Heights Housing Cooperative 
Joshua Nkomo Heights is found in Kambuzuma, south west of Harare 
CBD (Mupondi, 2003). Having been allocated land it subdivided it and gave 
stands to its members. This was on a farm invaded by war veterans soon 
after independence. Member named their cooperative in honor of the late 
Vice-President of Zimbabwe, Comrade Joshua Nkomo. The principal aim of 
the setting the cooperative was to provide space to women in their pursuit 
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towards acquiring housing (though it also had male members). Women had 
been noted as excluded in the existing housing schemes owing to patriarchy 
and institutionalized discrimination against them.  
Within its structures, Joshua Nkomo adopted transparency as a core 
value. In 2003, Joshua Nkomo had 2500 stands of varying sizes (of between 
300 square meters and 500 hundred square meters). Each member was 
entitled to pay a monthly subscription of between Z$3500 (about US$17.60 
then) and Z$5000 (about US$25 then) depending on the size of the stand 
allocated to him or her. Those members working within the cooperative 
arranged to guarantee that the monthly subscription was paid at the end of 
each month. Others paid by sweat equity, which involved using their labor 
in molding bricks for the cooperative.  
Mupondi (2003) has established that both the men and women were 
involved in brick molding, working on an average of eight hours per day 
leaving them with no free time to do anything else let alone to get a little 
extra earning to use for their upkeep. Because of this concerted effort in 
putting together financial and labor, material resources were mobilized and 
core houses of two rooms per family were built. Some ready houses were 
immediately availed to members on the queue. First preference was given to 
those paid-up members, in terms of monthly subscriptions. Despite their 
efforts to produce the required deposits and producing their identification 
particulars, most women could not readily access the houses. Such a case 
reveals the politics of gender imbalance in which some cooperatives are 
hijacked by men.  
One female respondent in Mupondi’s study argued that, “It is all 
because women lack in self-confidence and mutual respect. That is why, 
even when one woman decides to contest for the seat of a councilor, most 
women would rather not support the woman but men. It is our fault. We 
give men a lot of leadership chances” (Mupondi, 2003:46). Though the 
cooperative began with women, at the end, in terms of stands’ allocations, 
of the 190 members, only 50 women had benefited. Most women in the 
cooperative ‘retreated behind their husbands’ fearing that whatever the case 
might be men would eventually take over the project that began primarily as 
a women project. Male corruption was becoming viral and this saw the 
selection of a committee composed of both males and females 
representatives to create a code of conduct. Nevertheless, the women formed 
a club to help boost their income to pay monthly subscriptions. Among the 
club activities were fundraisings and sponsored walks. 
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Discussion and Policy Implications 
The critical component that can be learnt also from the two 
cooperatives studied in this paper is their involvement of women in housing 
development. Although questions can be raised as to who benefits more but 
their involvement is a critical issue to note. This is vital because 
development policies in Zimbabwe be it spatial, social or economic are 
largely gender insensitive as they are biased towards men. Women are 
mostly forgotten and seen as peripheral or tangential beings when it comes 
to development priorities. Housing in Zimbabwe has not been addressed 
holistically and little attention has been given to women's housing needs. 
Key shelter problems experienced by women have always included access 
to land, the cost and financing of housing, meeting eligibility requirements, 
access to information, procedures and regulations, lack of skills, time and 
self-confidence, and unsuitable house designs. As noted from Joshua 
Nkomo, women are often discriminated with respect to their rights to land, 
and legal changes may be needed to give women responsible for households 
the right to title to land in their own names, to allocate plots to couples in 
their joint names, and to ensure that widows, divorcees and deserted women 
retain rights to land and/or a share in the proceeds of its sale. Even 
participation is very critical for them. Women often lack access to 
information about the availability of land, housing construction materials 
and credit. 
Tashinga Housing Cooperative seems to have been more organized as 
in the course of their operation acquired project managers in the name of 
Housing People of Zimbabwe. This was a noble as project managers helped 
them source loans to finance their housing activities. In addition, project 
managers come with a lot of technical expertise which cooperatives lack in 
their set-ups. Whilst, on the other hand Joshua Nkomo housing cooperative 
adopted transparency as a core value/principle, evidence on the ground 
paints a distinct picture as corruption among male members is reported. 
More so, the cooperatives seem to lack a proper management structure that 
is accountable to stand beneficiaries. Largely this is caused by lack of a 
legal framework for good corporate governance of co-operatives. As a result 
many end up being compromised projects with some dissatisfaction on the 
part of the beneficiaries. Co-operatives are not companies neither are they 
non-profit making entities. They are there to serve the needs of the society 
i.e. the quest to own a house. Also evident from both case studies is the 
unity of purpose within them. Although there are some extreme case of 
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corruption being reported, there organization and sense of cooperation is 
highly evident.  
Furthermore, whereas Tashinga was formed by a group of domestic 
workers seeking accommodation in 1988; Joshua Nkomo was formed by a 
group of war veterans soon after independence. It was war vets invading 
land and banking more on a ZANU PF ticket. In terms of composition 
Tashinga initially had 72% of women as members whilst Joshua Nkomo 
began with women, at the end, in terms of stands’ allocations, of the 190 
members, only 50 women had benefited culminating to 26%. Most women 
in the cooperative retreated behind their husbands fearing that whatever the 
case might be men would eventually take over the project that began 
primarily as a women project. Use of political leaders has been noted in 
Joshua Nkomo cooperative where the formation was buy war vets who 
largely claim that they fought for the country’s liberation struggle and 
therefore, have the right to land. More so, the use of the name Joshua 
Nkomo speaks more of who the cooperative is linked to. This has led to 
quite a number of cooperative in Zimbabwe forming and naming 
cooperatives after liberation war heroes. The sole reason is politicizing these 
housing cooperative for enrichment and political vote buy purposes whilst 
quality of services provided is suffering on the other hand. 
Conclusion 
Housing cooperatives have marked the dawning of a new era in the 
lives of the urban poor in Zimbabwean cities today.  This paper explored the 
possible measurements of this success. In terms of numbers of houses built, 
gender composition of the cooperatives or the quality of the habits and 
services developed. This paper examined and analyzed that there was no 
tension as such between formal institutions and informal institutions 
regarding women participating in the two cooperatives. Both housing 
cooperatives have assessed have strived to formalize their operations for 
them to be recognized officially. Tashinga peripherally sought the assistance 
of Mayor Chikwavaire while Joshua Nkomo Heights used party politics for 
its initial development and even survival. Both cooperatives managed to 
build houses and support infrastructure but over a long period of time. It is 
observed that success of the two housing co-operatives has variedly been 
function of patronage. The formal institutions have been very useful in 
giving direction to both cooperatives on the basis of transparency and 
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accountability. No doubt that urban land and infrastructure for housing are 
clearly ‘political goods’ even for ‘vote-buying’ and getting loyalty of the 
poor but in both cases this has not been clearly defined as so.  Indeed, the 
cooperatives learnt the secret of working closely with the incumbent ward 
councilor and mayor of the city as demonstrated in this paper. The success 
of a cooperative is function of balancing between managing politics while 
adhering to set standards by the formal institutions. 
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Snage neformalnog sektora u formalizovanju 
delovanja radi opstanka: primer dve ženske 
stambene zadruge u Harareu, Zimbabve 
 
A P S T R A K T  
 
Ovaj rad ima za cilj da ispita i analizira tenziju između formalnih i 
neformalnih institucija, procenjujući faktore koji objašnjavaju uspešan pristup 
naseljavanju od strane siromašnog stanovništva u Zimbabveu. U radu se daje 
anegdotska procena vezano za pitanja otvaranja od strane države prostora za 
nedržavne aktere, i kako su ove stambene zadruge nastojale da ozvaniče svoje 
poslovanje, dok su drugi koristili stranačku politiku za razvoj i „opstanak“. 
Pregled literature i studija slučaja odabranih ženskih stambenih zadruga u 
Harareu (Tashinga i Joshua Nkomo) su vođeni sledećim istraživačkim pitanjem: 
Da li je uspeh stambenih zadruga prevashodno funkcija pokroviteljstva ili činjenice 
da formalizovane strukture omogućavaju transparentnost i odgovornost u procesu 
naseljavanja. 
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